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Abstract. Cloud servers offer data outsourcing facility to their clients. A client
outsources her data without having any copy at her end. Therefore, she needs a
guarantee that her data are not modified by the server which may be malicious.
Data auditing is performed on the outsourced data to resolve this issue. Moreover,
the client may want all her data to be stored untampered. In this chapter, we
describe proofs of retrievability (POR) that convince the client about the integrity
of all her data.
Keywords: Cloud computing, Data auditing, Proofs of retrievability, Erasure
code, Message authentication code, Bilinear maps, Oblivious RAM.
1 Introduction
Proper storage and maintenance of data has been an important research problem in the
field of computer science. With the advent of cloud computing, cloud service providers
(CSP) offer various facilities to their clients. For example, clients can outsource their
computational workload to the cloud server, or clients having limited storage capacity
can store huge amount of data in the server. Several storage service providers (SSP)
provide this type of storage outsourcing facility to their clients. Amazon Simple Storage
Service (S3) [1], Google Drive [34], Dropbox [23] are a few of them to mention. These
storage service providers (we will use SSP and server interchangeably in this chapter)
store clients’ data in lieu of monetary benefits. The nature of the outsourced data may
be static (never modified once they are uploaded) or dynamic (clients can modify them).
On the other hand, the servers can be malicious to maximize the benefits with a constant
amount of storage at their end. We consider a situation as follows. Suppose, a server has
100 GB (say) of storage capability. Now, there are two clients requesting for 100 GB of
storage each to the server. The server may store 50 GB data of each client and claim that
it has stored 200 GB data. When any client wants to download her data from the server,
she gets only half of her data. Therefore, the client needs a guarantee that her data have
been stored intact by the server. In case of any modification or deletion of data, the
server needs to compensate the client appropriately. Hence, the only question remains
is that how to guarantee the integrity of the client’s data. To address the problem of
⋆ This is an author’s version of the chapter published in Guide to Security Assurance for Cloud
Computing (Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015). The final publication is
available at link.springer.com.
checking the integrity of data, auditing comes into play. Audits may be performed as
often as asked by the client. If a server can pass an audit, then the client is convinced that
her file (or some part of it) is stored untampered. However, a server can pass an audit
without storing the file properly, but the probability of such an event is “very small” (a
negligible function in the security parameter as defined in Section 2.1).
One naive way of auditing is as follows. A client does some preprocessing on her
data before uploading them to the cloud server. This preprocessing phase includes
attaching some cryptographic authenticators (or tags) corresponding to segments (or
blocks) of the data file. In the following section, we discuss about some cryptographic
tools based on which these authenticators are designed. The idea of using these authen-
ticators is to prevent the server from modifying the file and still passing an audit with
high probability. Now, the client uploads the processed file (data file along with the au-
thenticators) to the storage server. During an audit, the client downloads the whole file
along with the tags to her end, and verify the authenticity of each of the blocks. The
server passes an audit if and only if each block-authenticator pair is valid.
The naive idea mentioned above suffers from severe drawbacks. Every time a client
asks for an audit, she has to download all her data from the server which incurs a high
communication bandwidth. To overcome this issue, researchers have come up with what
is called proofs of storage. As before, the client computes an authenticator for each
block of her data (or file), and uploads the file along with the authenticators. During
an audit protocol, the client samples a predefined number of random block-indices and
sends them to the server (challenge). The server does some computations over the chal-
lenge, stored data and authenticators, and sends a response to the client who verifies the
integrity of her data based on this response. This is an example of provable data posses-
sion (PDP) introduced by Ateniese et al. [5]. This work is followed by other provable
data possession schemes [6,20,25,4]. Though these schemes guarantee the integrity of
almost all the blocks of the data file, PDP cannot convince the client about the integrity
of all the blocks. The outsourced data may contain some sensitive accounting informa-
tion which the client do not want to lose. On the other hand, losing the compression
table of a compressed file makes the whole file unavailable. In such circumstances, the
client wants a stronger notion than PDP which would guarantee that the entire file has
been stored properly and the client can retrieve her file at any point of time.
The first paper introducing proofs of retrievability (POR) for static data is by Juels
and Kaliski [38] (a similar idea was given for sublinear authenticators by Naor and
Rothblum [47]). They introduce erasure coding (see Section 2.5) to the proofs of stor-
age. The underlying idea is to encode the original file with some erasure code, compute
authenticators for the blocks of the encoded file, and then upload the file along with the
authenticators to the data server. With this technique, the server has to delete or modify
a considerable number of blocks to actually delete or modify a data block. Thus, the
probability that the server passes an audit, given some data blocks are actually deleted
or modified, is “very small”. This technique ensures that all the blocks of the file are
correctly stored at the server’s end. This notion is formalized by defining an extractor
algorithmwhich can extract, with high probability, the original file after interactingwith
a server which passes an audit with some non-negligible probability. We review some
of the POR schemes in this chapter.
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The organization of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2, we describe some no-
tations and tools which will be used in later sections. Section 3 discusses some POR
schemes for static data. In Section 4, we describe some POR schemes for dynamic data.
We conclude the chapter in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly discuss about some backgroundsneeded for understanding the
following sections. The detailed discussions can be found in [65,39,28,29,61,3,30,44].
2.1 Notation
We take λ as the security parameter. An algorithm A(1λ) is called a probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithm when its running time is polynomial in λ and its output y is
a random variable which depends on the internal coin tosses of A. We write y ← A(·)
or y ← A(·, . . . , ·) depending upon whether A takes one input or more inputs, respec-
tively. Moreover, if A is given access to an oracle O, we write y ← AO(·, . . . , ·). In
this case, the Turing machine A has an additional query tape where A places its query
x and calls another Turing machine O. Then, O is invoked with the input x, and the
output is written on the same query tape [61,3]. An element a chosen uniformly at ran-
dom from a set S is denoted as a
R
←− S. A function f : N → R is called negligible in
λ if for all positive integers c and for all sufficiently large λ, we have f(λ) < 1
λc
. We
call a problem “hard” to denote that no polynomial-time algorithms exist for solving
the problem.
2.2 Message Authentication Code (MAC)
Let f : K ×M → D be a function, where the K is the key space,M is the message
space and |D| ≪ |M|. In other words, f takes as inputs a secret key k ∈ K and a
message m ∈ M, and it outputs d ∈ D. The piece of information d is a message
authentication code (MAC) [65] if the following properties are satisfied.
1. Givenm and d, it is hard to find anotherm′ 6= m such that fk(m) = fk(m
′).
2. The value of fk(m) should be uniformly distributed in the set D.
3. The value of fk(m) should depend on every bit of the messagem equally.
Message authentication codes are used as a digest to authenticate the message. MACs
are defined in symmetric setting, that is, the sender and the receiver need to share a
secret key. In the generation phase, the sender calculates the MAC for the message
using the secret key and sends the message along with the MAC. In the verification
phase the receiver verifies, using the same key, whether the MAC is computed on the
given message using the same secret key. Due to the first property mentioned above, it
is hard to modify a messagem keeping the value of fk(m) unchanged.
Message authentication codes are used hugely for authentication purposes. There
are several constructions for MACs. Some of the constructions are based on pseudo-
random functions [39,28,42] (e.g., XOR MAC [7], CMAC [48]), and some of them are
based on cryptographic hash functions (e.g., HMAC [49]).
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2.3 Bilinear Maps
Let G1, G2 and GT be multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p. Let g1 and g2
be generators of the groups G1 and G2, respectively. A bilinear map [40,43,27] is a
function e : G1 ×G2 → GT such that:
1. for all u ∈ G1, v ∈ G2, a, b ∈ Zp, we have e(u
a, vb) = e(u, v)ab (bilinear
property),
2. e is non-degenerate, that is, e(g1, g2) 6= 1.
Furthermore, properties 1 and 2 imply that
3. for all u1, u2 ∈ G1, v ∈ G2, we have e(u1 · u2, v) = e(u1, v) · e(u2, v).
If G1 = G2 = G, the bilinear map is symmetric; otherwise, asymmetric. Unless other-
wise mentioned, we consider bilinear maps which are symmetric and efficiently com-
putable. Let BLSetup(1λ) be an algorithm which outputs (p, g,G,GT , e), the parame-
ters of a bilinear map, where g is a generator of G.
2.4 Digital Signature
Diffie and Hellman introduce the public-key cryptography and the notion of digital sig-
natures in their seminal paper “New Directions in Cryptography” [21]. Rivest, Shamir
and Adleman [55] propose the first digital signature scheme based on the RSA assump-
tion. Several signature schemes are available in the literature. Several signature schemes
are found in the literature [41,53,45,26,24,56,50,36,11,15,14,17,35,9,19,10].
We define a digital signature scheme as proposed by Goldwasser et al. [32]. A digital
signature scheme consists of the following polynomial-time algorithms: a key genera-
tion algorithm KeyGen, a signing algorithm Sign and a verification algorithm Verify.
KeyGen takes as input the security parameter λ and outputs a pair of keys (pk, sk),
where sk is the secret key and pk is the corresponding public key. Algorithm Sign takes
a message m from the message space M and the secret key sk as input and outputs
a signature σ. Algorithm Verify takes as input the public key pk, a message m and a
signature σ, and outputs accept or reject depending upon whether the signature is
valid or not. Any of these algorithms can be probabilistic in nature. A digital signature
scheme has the following properties.
1. Correctness: Algorithm Verify always accepts a signature generated by an honest
signer, that is,
Pr[Verify(pk,m, Sign(sk,m)) = accept] = 1.
2. Security: Let Signsk(·) be the signing oracle andA be any probabilistic polynomial-
time adversary with an oracle access to Signsk(·). The adversaryA makes polyno-
mial number of sign queries to Signsk(·) for different messages and gets back the
signatures on those messages. The signature scheme is secure if A cannot pro-
duce, except with some probability negligible in λ, a valid signature on a mes-
sage not queried previously, that is, for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary
ASignsk(·), the following probability
Pr[(m,σ)← ASignsk(·)(1λ) : m 6∈ Q ∧ Verify(pk,m, σ) = accept]
is negligible in λ, where Q is the set of sign queries made byA to Signsk(·).
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As a concrete example, we mention the algorithms of the BLS signature proposed by
Boneh, Lynn and Shacham [11]. Let the algorithm BLSetup(1λ) output (p, g,G,GT , e)
as the parameters of a bilinear map, where G and GT are multiplicative cyclic groups
of prime order p, g is a generator ofG and e : G×G→ GT (see Section 2.3). KeyGen
chooses sk
R
←− Zp as the secret key, and the public key is set to be pk = g
sk. The
algorithm Sign uses a full-domain hash H : {0, 1}∗ → G, and it generates a signature
σ = H(m)sk on a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗. Given a message-signature pair (m,σ), the
algorithm Verify checks e(σ, g)
?
= e(H(m), pk). Verify outputs accept if and only if
the equality holds.
2.5 Erasure Code
An (n, f, d)Σ erasure code is a forward error-correcting code [44] that consists of an
encoding algorithm Enc: Σf → Σn (encodes a message consisting of f symbols into
a longer codeword consisting of n symbols) and a decoding algorithm Dec: Σn → Σf
(decodes a codeword to a message), where Σ is a finite alphabet and d is the minimum
distance (Hamming distance between any two codewords is at least d) of the code. The
quantity f
n
is called the rate of the code. An (n, f, d)Σ erasure code can tolerate up
to d − 1 erasures. If d = n − f + 1, we call the code a maximum distance separable
(MDS) code. For an MDS code, the original message can be reconstructed from any f
out of n symbols of the codeword [46]. Reed-Solomon codes [54] and their extensions
are examples of non-trivial MDS codes. We give a simple example, from [44], of a
Reed-Solomon code below.
Let us consider the finite field F22 = {0, 1, α, γ = α
2} with α2 + α + 1 = 0. A
(3, 2, 2) Reed-Solomon code over F22 consists of 16 codewords:
000 1α0 γ0α γα1
01α αγ0 10γ 111
0αγ γ10 1γα ααα
0γ1 α01 α1γ γγγ.
This code can correct a single erasure (d− 1 = 1). For example, 1 ∗ γ (‘∗’ denotes the
erasure) can be decoded uniquely to 10γ. In other words, a partially erased codeword
can be reconstructed from the other two symbols available.
2.6 Oblivious RAM
Goldreich and Ostrovsky introduce the notion of oblivious RAM (ORAM) [31]. In a
RAM (Random Access Memory) model, there is a CPU and a memory module. Any-
one can intercept the communications between the CPU and the memory module, and
observe the memory-access patterns. Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is a probabilistic RAM
where the access-pattern is independent of the address input to the memory module.
ORAM involves a hierarchical data structure which allows hiding memory-access
patterns. This data structure consists of hash tables of different lengths at different lev-
els. The number of levels is O(log n). An element of a hash table contains an (address,
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value) pair. When an address is searched for a read operation, the address is first hashed
and the hash value is matched with the hash table at the top level. If a match is not
found, the address is hashed again and matched with the hash table in the next level,
and so on. If a match is found, random locations are searched in the hash tables in the
subsequent levels. This is continued until the last level. If an address is found more than
once, ORAM returns the most updated value residing at the topmost level. For a write
operation, the new value is inserted into the hash table of the top level. As each address-
search is associated with hash tables in every level of the hierarchical data structure,
an adversary cannot gain any knowledge about the pattern of the search. For the same
reason, ORAM takes time polynomial in logn for each read or write operation as all the
hash tables need to be consulted to hide the actual access-pattern. There is a “rebuild”
phase which is executed periodically to rebuild the levels (due to too many insertions).
Recent works on ORAM include [52,33,59,62,64,37,67].
2.7 Proofs of Retrievability
A client uploads a file to the cloud server. However, the client needs a guarantee that
all her data are stored in the server untampered. Proofs-of-retrievability (POR) schemes
make the client be assured that her data are stored intact in the server. Juels and Kaliski
introduce proofs of retrievability for static data [38]. Static data mostly include archival
data which the client does not modify after she uploads the file to the server. However,
some of the POR schemes deal with dynamic data where the client modifies her data.
We provide a brief idea about the building blocks of POR schemes. We discuss them in
detail in Section 3 and Section 4.
In the setup phase, the client preprocesses her file F0. The preprocessing step in-
volves encoding the file F0 with an erasure code to form another file F . Then, an au-
thenticator is attached to each of the blocks of F (for checking the integrity of the
blocks later). Finally, the client uploads F along with the authenticators to the server.
We consider the file F as a collection of n blocks or segments where each block is
an element of Zp. The client can read data from the file she has outsourced. She per-
forms audits to check the integrity of her data. An audit comprises of two algorithms
for proof-generation and proof-verification. During an audit, the client generates a ran-
dom challenge and sends it to the server which acts as a prover. Upon receiving the
challenge, the server responds to the client with a proof. The client then verifies the
integrity of the data by checking the validity of the proof. If the proof is valid, the ver-
ification algorithm outputs 1; otherwise, it outputs 0. For dynamic POR schemes, the
client can issue write operations along with read operations. The basic operations are
illustrated in Fig. 1.
POR schemes satisfy two properties: correctness and soundness. The correctness
property demands that the proof generated by an honest server always makes the ver-
ification algorithm output 1. The soundness property of POR schemes is formalized
by the existence of an extractor algorithm that extracts F after interacting with a ma-
licious server which passes an audit (that is, the verification algorithm outputs 1) with
any probability non-negligible in the security parameter λ.
There are two types of POR schemes: privately verifiable and publicly verifiable
schemes. In private-verification schemes, only the client can perform audits as the ver-
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Fig. 1. Basics of a proofs-of-retrievability scheme.
ification of a proof requires some secret information. On the other hand, in publicly
verifiable schemes, anyone can verify the proof supplied by the server. In privacy pre-
serving auditing, the verifier (any verifier other than the client) cannot gain any knowl-
edge about the data outsourced to the server [66].
3 Proofs of Retrievability for Static Data
In the static setting, the client does not modify her data once they are outsourced to the
cloud server. We discuss two POR schemes for static data below. However, there are
other POR schemes related to static data. We mention some of them in Section 5.
3.1 POR Scheme by Juels and Kaliski
Juels and Kaliski [38] propose the first POR scheme for static data. A similar scheme for
online memory checking is given by Naor and Rothblum [47]. Though the basic idea is
the same for both of the schemes, the first one uses a sentinels (random strings that are
independent of the file’s content) and the latter scheme uses MACs for authentication.
Here, we describe the MAC-based solution and make a brief note about the sentinel-
based solution.
The client selects k
R
←− K as her secret key, where K is the key space for a MAC.
Let the client have a file F0 with f blocks or segments which she wants to upload to
the cloud server. The client encodes F0 with an erasure code to form a file F with n
segments. Let each segment of the file F be an element of Zp, that is, F [i] ∈ Zp for all
1 6 i 6 n. The client computes σi = MACk(i||F [i]) for all 1 6 i 6 n and uploads the
file F along with the tags {σi}16i6n to the server.
During an audit, the client generates a random challenge Q = {i} and sends it to
the server which acts as a prover. Upon receiving Q, the prover responds to the client
with {(F [i], σi)}i∈Q. The verification algorithm, for each i ∈ Q, checks if
σi
?
= MACk(i||F [i]),
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and outputs 1 if the equality holds for each i ∈ Q; it outputs 0, otherwise. If the MAC
scheme is secure, then the server cannot produce a validMAC on a message of its choice
without knowing the secret key k. Now, the client can get a fraction (say, ρ) of the data
blocks of F by interacting with a server which passes an audit with some probability,
non-negligible in the security parameter λ. Since the initial file F0 has been encoded to
form F , all the blocks of F0 can be retrieved from ρ-fraction of blocks of F .
The scheme mentioned above is privately verifiable as only the client (having the
knowledge of the secret key k) can verify the integrity of her data. However, this scheme
can be turned into a publicly verifiable scheme if MACs are replaced by digital signa-
tures.
In the original scheme proposed by Juels and Kaliski [38], the blocks of the encoded
file F are encrypted and a large number of random elements (sentinels) are inserted in
random locations of F . The server cannot distinguish between the encrypted blocks of
F and the sentinels. During an audit, the verifier (only the client can be the verifier)
checks the authenticity of several sentinels at different positions. If the server modifies
a considerable fraction of the blocks, a similar fraction of sentinels are modified as well
(as the sentinels are inserted in random locations of F ). The server cannot selectively
delete non-sentinel blocks as it cannot distinguish them from sentinels. Thus, with high
probability, the server cannot pass the audit. On the other hand, once the client chal-
lenges for some sentinel-locations, they are revealed to the server. Therefore, the future
challenges must not include these locations. This makes the number of audits that can
be performed in this scheme bounded.
3.2 POR Schemes by Shacham and Waters
Shacham and Waters propose two short and efficient homomorphic authenticators in
their POR schemes for static data [57,58]. The first one, based on pseudorandom func-
tions, provides a POR scheme which is privately verifiable (that is, only the client can
verify a proof) and secure in the standard model1; the second one, based on BLS signa-
tures (see Section 2.4), gives a POR scheme which is publicly verifiable (that is, anyone
can verify a proof) and secure in the random oracle model2 [8].
As mentioned by Shacham and Waters, Reed-Solomon codes are necessary against
adversarial erasures where the server can delete blocks selectively. One drawback of
these codes is the complexity of encoding and decoding isO(n2), where n is the number
of blocks of the file uploaded to the server. We can employ codes with linear decoding
time instead of Reed-Solomon codes. However, these codes are secure against random
erasures only. Shacham and Waters discuss a solution to this problem strictly for the
privately verifiable scheme. We briefly describe the schemes below.
1 Standard model is a model of computation where the security of a cryptographic scheme is
derived from some complexity assumptions (for example, hardness of factoring large inte-
gers [70], or hardness of finding discrete logarithm of an element of a finite group [68].)
2 Random oracle model is a model of computation where the security of a cryptographic scheme
is proven assuming a cryptographic hash function used in the scheme as a truly random func-
tion.
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POR Scheme with Private Verification The client chooses (α, k) as her secret key,
where α
R
←− Zp and k
R
←− K (K is the key space for a pseudorandom function). Let
h : K×{0, 1}∗ → Zp be a pseudorandom function [39,28,42]. Let the client have a file
F0 with f blocks or segments which she wants to upload to the cloud server. The client
encodes F0 with an erasure code to form a file F with n segments. Let each segment of
the file F be an element of Zp, that is, F [i] ∈ Zp for all 1 6 i 6 n. The client computes
σi = hk(i) + αF [i] (mod p) for all 1 6 i 6 n and uploads the file F along with the
tags {σi}16i6n to the server.
During an audit, the client generates a random query Q = {(i, νi)} and sends it
to the server which acts as a prover. Upon receiving Q, the prover computes σ =∑
(i,νi)∈Q
νiσi (mod p) and µ =
∑
(i,νi)∈Q
νiF [i] (mod p). The prover responds
to the client with (σ, µ). Then the client verifies the integrity of her data by checking
the verification equation
σ
?
=

αµ+
∑
(i,νi)∈Q
νihk(i)

 (mod p),
and outputs 1 or 0 depending on whether the equality holds or not. As discussed in
Section 2.7, a POR scheme is correct if the verifier always outputs 1 when the proof is
supplied by an honest server. The correctness of the scheme can be proved as below.
Correctness: σ ∼=
∑
(i,νi)∈Q
νiσi
∼=
∑
(i,νi)∈Q
νi (hk(i) + αF [i])
∼= α
∑
(i,νi)∈Q
νiF [i] +
∑
(i,νi)∈Q
νihk(i)
∼=

αµ+
∑
(i,νi)∈Q
νihk(i)

 (mod p)
In this privately verifiable scheme, only the client can perform the verification as the
verification algorithm requires the knowledge of the secret key (α, k).
POR Scheme with Public Verification Let there be an algorithm BLSetup(1λ) that
outputs (p, g,G,GT , e) as the parameters of a bilinear map, where G and GT are
multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p = Θ(λ), g is a generator of G and
e : G × G → GT (see Section 2.3). The client chooses x
R
←− Zp as her secret key.
The public key of the client is v = gx. Let α
R
←− G be another generator of G and
H : {0, 1}∗ → G be the BLS hash (see Section 2.4). Let the client have a file F0 with
f blocks or segments which she wants to upload to the cloud server. The client encodes
F0 with an erasure code to form a file F with n segments. Let each segment of the file
F be an element of Zp, that is, F [i] ∈ Zp for all 1 6 i 6 n. The client computes
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σi = (H(i) · α
F [i])x for all 1 6 i 6 n and uploads the file F along with the tags
{σi}16i6n to the server.
During an audit, the verifier generates a random query Q = {(i, νi)} and sends
it to the server which acts as a prover. Upon receiving Q, the prover computes σ =∏
(i,νi)∈Q
σi
νi and µ =
∑
(i,νi)∈Q
νiF [i] (mod p). The prover responds to the veri-
fier with (σ, µ). Then the verifier verifies the integrity of client’s data by checking the
verification equation
e(σ, g)
?
= e

 ∏
(i,νi)∈Q
H(i)νi · αµ, v

 ,
and outputs 1 or 0 depending on whether the equality holds or not. The correctness of
the scheme can be proved as below.
Correctness: σ =
∏
(i,νi)∈Q
σνii
=
∏
(i,νi)∈Q
(H(i) · αF [i])νix
=

 ∏
(i,νi)∈Q
H(i)νi ·
∏
(i,νi)∈Q
ανiF [i]


x
=

 ∏
(i,νi)∈Q
H(i)νi · α
∑
(i,νi)∈Q
νiF [i]


x
=

 ∏
(i,νi)∈Q
H(i)νi · αµ


x
In this publicly verifiable scheme, the verifier does not need the secret key x to verify
the response from the prover; knowledge of the public key pk would suffice for that
purpose. Due to this reason, any third party auditor (TPA) can perform audits on behalf
of the client (owner of the data). In privacy preserving auditing, there is an additional
requirement that the TPA should not learn the data on which the audits are being per-
formed. For example, Wang et al. use the publicly verifiable scheme of Shacham and
Waters, and they achieve privacy preserving auditing using a technique called random
masking [66].
4 Proofs of Retrievability for Dynamic Data
In the previous section, we have described some POR schemes for static data which the
clients do not modify once they are uploaded in the cloud server. A natural question
comes if any POR schemes are available for dynamic data where the clients modify
their outsourced data “efficiently”. In this section, we discuss about the difficulties of
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modification of the uploaded data. Then, we will mention two POR schemes for dy-
namic data.
To maintain the retrievability of the whole file, erasure coding has been employed
on the file. The blocks of the file are encoded in such a way that the file can be re-
trieved from a fraction of blocks of the encoded file. The content of each block is now
distributed in other O(n) blocks. Therefore, to actually delete a block the server has
to delete all the related blocks. This restricts the server from deleting or modifying a
block maliciously and still passing the verification with non-negligible probability in
λ. However, this advantage comes with some drawbacks. If the client wants to update
a single block, she has to update all the related blocks as well. This makes the update
process inefficient as n can be very large.
Cash et al. [16] discuss about two failed attempts to provide a solution of the prob-
lem mentioned above. In the first case, a possible solution might be to encode the file
locally. Now, each codeword consists of a small number of blocks. Therefore, an up-
date of a single block requires an update of a few blocks within that particular codeword.
However, a malicious server can gain the knowledge of this small set of blocks (within
a codeword) whenever the client updates a single block. Thus, the server can delete
this small set of blocks without being noticed during an audit. In the second attempt,
after encoding the file locally, all of the n blocks are permuted in a pseudorandom fash-
ion. Apparently, the server cannot get any information about the blocks in a codeword.
However, during an update the server can identify the related blocks in a codeword.
Therefore, the server can again delete these blocks and pass the verification during an
audit.
Due to the issues discussed above, only a few POR schemes for dynamic data are
available in the literature. Now, we briefly mention two of these schemes below. The
first scheme [16] exploits oblivious RAM for hiding data-access patterns. The second
scheme [60] uses an incremental code to reduce the amortized cost for updates.
4.1 POR Scheme by Cash, Ku¨pc¸u¨ and Wichs
Cash et al. [16] propose a POR scheme for dynamic data using ORAM (see Section 2.6).
They proceed as the first attempt mentioned in Section 4. That is, the data is divided
into several chunks where each chunk contains a few blocks in it. Then, the blocks in
each chunk are encoded “locally” using an erasure code to form a codeword. Thus,
an update on a single block requires updating only related blocks of that particular
codeword. This makes the update process much more efficient than that when all the
blocks of the data are encoded to form a single large codeword. However, this solution
comes with a drawback that the malicious server can now identify all the related blocks
and delete these blocks selectively. As the number of blocks in a codeword is small, the
server has a considerable chance to get through an audit.
Cash et al. introduce ORAM as a solution for the problem mentioned above, still
keeping the update-complexity low. Small chunks are encoded to form small codewords
to make the updates efficient. However, the challenge is to hide the access-patterns from
the server so that the server cannot identify the blocks in a codeword. ORAM lets the
client read from the outsourced data in a pseudorandom fashion (using ORAM-Read
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protocol). It also provides a privacy-preserving way to write the blocks of a codeword
(using ORAM-Write protocol).We give a high-level overview of the scheme as follows.
In the setup phase, data blocks are divided into chunks and chunks are encoded
to form codewords. In this phase, the ORAM protocol is initiated as well. For a read
operation, the exact location of the block is found from the chunk-address (add ch) and
the offset (add off ), and this address is fed into ORAM-Read. For a write operation,
add ch and add off are calculated first. Then, the codeword corresponding to add ch is
obtained (using ORAM-Read) and decoded. The exact block is located (using add off )
and modified accordingly. The new chunk is now encoded again and updated in the
server using ORAM-Write. To run the audit protocol, a set of random locations are read
using ORAM-Read and their authenticity is checked. The verifier outputs 1 if and only
if the data-integrity is preserved.
4.2 POR Scheme by Shi, Stefanov and Papamanthou
The privacy of the access-patterns is achieved by the scheme proposed by Cash et
al. [16]. However, Shi et al. [60] argue that a POR scheme need not hide the access-
patterns and it must satisfy only two properties: authenticated storage (the client needs
an assurance about the authenticity of her data) and retrievability (the client can ex-
tract her data at any point of time). Shi et al. propose another dynamic POR scheme
where the scheme satisfies these two properties, and it is more efficient (in terms of
the computation-cost or communication bandwidth required for the basic operations)
than the scheme by Cash et al. as the additional cost for hiding access-patterns is now
eliminated. Here, we describe the basic construction of the scheme briefly.
The main challenge is to reduce the write cost since an update in a single block
is followed by updates on other O(n) blocks. In this scheme, the encoded copy is not
updated for every write operation. Instead, it is updated (or rebuilt) only when suffi-
cient updates are done on the data file. Thus, the amortized cost for writes is reduced
dramatically. However, between two such rebuilds this encoded copy stores stale data.
Therefore, they introduce a temporary hierarchical log structure which stores values for
these intermediate writes. During an audit, O(λ) random locations of the encoded data
file as well as the hierarchical log structure are checked for authenticity. The scheme in-
volves three data structures: an uncoded buffer U which is updated updated after every
write and reads are performed on this buffer only, an encoded (using an erasure code)
buffer C which is updated after every n writes, and an encoded log structure H which
accommodates every update between two rebuilds of C.
The buffer U contains an up-to-date copy of the data file. Reads and writes are per-
formed directly on the required locations of U. Merkle hash tree [71,45] is used for U to
check the authenticity of the read block. Reads and writes are never performed directly
on the buffer C. After n write operations, the buffer U is encoded using an erasure code
(see Section 2.5) to form a new copy of C, and the existing copy of C is replaced by
this new one. The log structure H consists of logn+ 1 levels and stores the intermedi-
ate updates temporarily. The l-th level consists of an encoded copy of 2l blocks using
a (2l+1, 2l, 2l)-erasure code for each 0 6 l 6 log n + 1. When a block is updated it
is written in the topmost level (l = 0). If the top l levels are already full, a rebuild is
performed to accommodate all the blocks up to l-th level as well as the new block in the
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(l+1)-th level and to make all the levels up to l-th level empty. Shi et al. employs a fast
incrementally constructible code based on Fast Fourier Transform [69]. Using this code,
the rebuild cost of l-th level takes O(β · 2l) time, where β is the block size. The l-th
level is rebuild after 2l writes. Therefore, the amortized cost for rebuilding isO(β logn)
per write operation. This improves the earlier scheme of Cash et al. [16] which requires
O(βλ(log n)2). Each rebuild of C is followed by making H empty. To perform an audit,
the verifier chooses O(λ) random locations of the encoded buffer C and O(λ) random
locations of each full level of the hierarchical log structure H, and check for authen-
ticity. The verification algorithm outputs 1 if all the blocks are authentic; it outputs 0,
otherwise.
Shi et al. [60] improve this basic construction by using homomorphic checksums. In
this improved construction, the cost of communication bandwidth and the cost of client
computation are further reduced to β + O(λ log n). However, the server computation
remains the same, that is, O(β logn).
5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have given a brief overview of proofs-of-retrievability (POR), and
we have discussed some POR schemes. There are several POR schemes in the literature
which we have not covered in this chapter. Interested readers may take a look at these
works [22,51,13,18,12,2,63].
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